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Mandatory Family Mediation and the
Settlement Mission: A Feminist Critique
Noel Semple
En Ame´rique du Nord, les conflits familiaux font tre`s souvent l’objet de me´diation
ou` une tierce partie neutre tente de trouver avec les e´poux une re´solution volontaire
de leurs diffe´rends. La me´diation familiale compte de nombreux partisans et de
nombreuses partisanes enthousiastes, et dans plusieurs juridictions, elle constitue
un passage oblige´ avant d’entreprendre les proce´dures traditionnelles.
Cependant, elle a aussi donne´ lieu a` une critique fe´ministe puissante qui conside`re
le de´se´quilibre des pouvoirs et la violence familiale comme des sources d’exploita-
tion et de re´sultats injustes obtenus par la me´diation. Le pre´sent article synthe´tise la
critique fe´ministe de la me´diation familiale, et e´value les efforts faits dans la pra-
tique de la me´diation contemporaine pour y re´pondre. Meˆme en l’absence de
me´diation familiale formelle, les juges et les autres travailleurs et travailleuses
de l’appareil judiciaire en matie`re familiale soumettront vraisemblablement les
e´poux en litige a` des pressions informelles pour trouver un re`glement. Le pre´sent
article de´fend l’ide´e que la critique fe´ministe est peut-eˆtre plus pertinente a` cette
« mission de re`glement » qu’a` la me´diation familiale formelle telle qu’elle se pra-
tique de nos jours.
North American family law conflicts are very often brought to mediation, in which a
neutral third party attempts to bring about a voluntary resolution of the spouses’
dispute. Family mediation has many enthusiastic supporters and has in many jur-
isdictions been made a mandatory precursor to traditional litigation. However, it
has also given rise to a potent feminist critique, which identifies power imbalance
and domestic violence as sources of exploitation and unjust mediated outcomes.
This article summarizes the feminist critique of family mediation and assesses
the efforts of contemporary mediation practice to respond to it. Even in the
absence of formal family mediation, litigating spouses are likely to be subjected
to substantial informal pressure to settle from judges and other family justice
system workers. The article argues that the feminist critique might be more relevant
to this “settlement mission” than it is to formal family mediation as it is practised
today.
In family mediation, a neutral third party seeks to bring about the voluntary resol-
ution of a dispute between separating spouses. Family mediation is experiencing a
renaissance in the province of Ontario. The government has pledged to make it
available on a subsidized basis in every court that hears divorce and related
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matters in the province.
1
Going further, the chief justice of Ontario recently called
for mediation to be made a mandatory precursor to court for most family law
litigants.
2
The idea that divorcing or separating people should be required to attempt
mediation before going to court is not a new one—it was first implemented
in the United States in 1980.
3
However, family law mediation also gave rise
to a trenchant feminist critique, which gathered steam in the mid-1980s and
became a central part of the mediation literature by the mid-1990s. This
article asks: should the feminist critique temper official enthusiasm for family
mediation?
The first part of this article describes family mediation and the benefits that it
claims. The second part reviews the feminist critique of family mediation, which
has at its core the analysis of power imbalance, domestic violence, and their conse-
quences for family dispute resolution. The critique has considerable force, even if
mediation is not usually the catastrophe for women that some anticipated. The third
part of this article shows that the force of the feminist critique has been recognized
by mediators and policy makers, who have fine-tuned mediation programs in
response to it. Court-adjunct family law mediation circa 2011 has profited greatly
from this feminist scrutiny.
The fourth part of this article will draw on the author’s empirical research to
propose another dimension for the debate. Avoiding mediation does not, in practice,
mean allowing family litigants speedy access to authoritative and neutral adjudica-
tion. Instead, it means exposing them to the “settlement mission”—the informal and
unregulated pressure to settle that family justice system workers apply to women
and men experiencing family breakdown. The settlement mission might actually
be more vulnerable to the feminist critique than formalized family mediation is
today. Ironically, since formal mandatory mediation would probably reduce the
need for the settlement mission, the feminist critique might weigh in favour of man-
datory mediation today.
1. Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario, “Families Will Benefit from Justice Improvements,”
Press Release, online: Province of Ontario ,http://news.ontario.ca/mag/en/2010/12/families-
will-benefit-from-justice-improvements.html..
2. Tracey Tyler, “Chief Justice Urges Forced Family Law Mediation,” Toronto Star (15 September
2010) A1; Cristin Schmitz, “Top Judge Proposes Free Court-Based Mediation, Ag Says ‘No
Money,’” Lawyers Weekly (8 October 2010), online: Lawyers Weekly ,http://www.
lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section=article&articleid=1264.; Judy Van Rhijn, “Chief Justice
Expands on Proposals to Redesign Family Law System,” Law Times (8 November 2010),
online: Law Times ,http://www.lawtimesnews.com/201011087841/Headline-News/Chief-
justice-expands-on-proposals-to-redesign-family-law-system..
3. Connie J Beck and Bruce Dennis Sales, Family Mediation: Facts, Myths, and Future Prospects, 1st
edition (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2001) at 7.
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Mandatory Mediation in Family Law
Mediation is a dispute resolution method involving a neutral third party who
does not have the authority to bind the parties.
4
Its defining characteristic is the
absence of an imposed outcome—mediation produces a resolution only if the
parties agree on the terms. Unlike adjudication or arbitration, mediation gives the
parties themselves the authority to reach a solution. However, unlike traditional
bipartite negotiation or newer innovations such as collaborative law, mediation
interposes a third party between the disputants.
5
Mediation’s advocates typically argue that it resolves disputes in an efficient and
effective manner, while offering the benefits of self-determination to the dispu-
tants.
6
Empirical studies have found that between 50 percent and 90 percent of
family disputes that enter mediation reach settlement.
7
Its self-determinative charac-
ter may lead to outcomes that are objectively superior to those that emerge from
adjudication, perhaps because mediation allows for more creative solutions.
8
It is
said that while a judge or arbitrator must usually “divide the pie” between civil liti-
gants, mediation generates opportunities to “expand the pie.”
9
Some empirical evi-
dence suggests that, when parties choose to mediate and then settle their dispute, the
resolution is more likely to be mutually satisfactory and durable than one that has
been adjudicated.
10
Mediation’s promised benefits have been summarized as “the
4. Robert A Baruch Bush and Joseph P Folger, The Promise of Mediation: The Transformative
Approach to Conflict, revised edition (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2005) at 8.
5. Wanda Wiegers and Michaela Keet, “Collaborative Family Law and Gender Inequalities: Balancing
Risks and Opportunities” (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 738. In collaborative family law
(CFL), the parties are represented by settlement-oriented lawyers with special training, often
assisted by other financial or mental health professionals. In the event that settlement does not
occur and the matter goes to court, the CFL lawyers must withdraw from the case.
6. American Bar Association, “Model Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation”
(2001) 35 Family Law Quarterly 27. Standard 1 states: “[M]ediation is based on the principle of
self-determination by the participants.” See also Nancy A Welsh, “Reconciling Self-
Determination, Coercion, and Settlement in Court-Connected Mediation” in Jay Folberg, Ann
Milne, and Peter Salem, eds, Divorce and Family Mediation: Models, Techniques, and
Applications (New York: Guilford Press, 2004) 420 at 420.
7. Joan B Kelly, “Family Mediation Research: Is There Empirical Support for the Field?” (2004) 22
Conflict Resolution Quarterly 3. However, in some of the studies that produced these high rates of
settlement, the cases that were mediated were not necessarily reflective of the entire population of
family law cases. Mediated cases might have a lower level of conflict on average than other cases,
which could contribute to the higher rate of settlement.
8. Marc Galanter and Mia Cahill, “ ‘Most Cases Settle’: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of
Settlements” (1994) 46 Stanford Law Review 1339 at 1350.
9. LonLFuller, “Mediation: Its Forms andFunctions” (1971) 44SouthernCaliforniaLawReview305 at 316.
10. Jo Daugherty Bailey and Susan P Robbins, “Couple Empowerment in Divorce: A Comparison of
Mediated and Nonmediated Outcomes” (2005) 22 Conflict Resolution Quarterly 453; Mary G
Marcus et al, “To Mediate or Not to Mediate: Financial Outcomes in Mediated versus Adversarial
Divorces” (1999) 17 Mediation Quarterly 143. Regarding re-litigation rates, see Glenn A Gilmour,
High-Conflict Separation and Divorce: Options for Consideration, Report no. 2004-FCY-1e
(Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 2004), online: Department of Justice Canada ,http://www.
justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/fcy-fea/lib-bib/rep-rap/2004/2004_1/index.html. at 36.
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four Cs.”
11
Conflict and cost are apparently reduced when mediation is used, and
the parties’ co-operation and control over their dispute are increased. Although
mediation was originally conceived as a voluntary option, most studies have
found that its benefits persist even when participation is mandatory for litigants.
12
Some of the advantages claimed for mediation are considered particularly attrac-
tive in the family law context. Because the parties are individuals rather than insti-
tutions or corporations, they usually have less ability to pay and cost savings are
important. The fact that the sums at stake are relatively small can make the cost
to the parties of a full-blown civil trial difficult to justify. As it has become more
and more normal for both parents to remain actively involved in their children’s
lives after separation, the need for co-operation and conflict-reduction between
them has come to the fore.
13
Mediation promises all of these fruits and has therefore
been welcomed in family law over the past thirty years.
14
In Toronto, for example,
one experienced family lawyer has estimated that 60 percent of divorcing couples
use some form of mediation.
15
Many policy makers and practitioners became enthusiastic about family
mediation in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but litigants did not voluntarily partici-
pate in large numbers.
16
Some jurisdictions therefore chose to make family
mediation mandatory. Connecticut and Massachusetts did so first in 1980, and
California followed in 1981.
17
By 1989, some 4,500 different American jurisdic-
tions had mandated mediation for custody and access cases.
18
Mandatory mediation today comes in a wide variety of forms. In Newfoundland
and in some American jurisdictions, mediation is mandatory when and if the judge
11. Elizabeth Scott and Robert E Emery, “Child Custody Dispute Resolution: The Adversarial System
and Divorce Mediation” in Lois AWeithorn, ed, Psychology and Child Custody Determinations:
Knowledge, Roles, and Expertise (Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press, 1987) at 45.
12. Linda D Elrod and Milfred D Dale, “Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum Swings in Child Custody:
The Interests of Children in the Balance” (2008) 42 Family Law Quarterly 381 at 408; Jessica
Pearson, “A Forum for Every Fuss: The Growth of Court Services and ADR Treatment for
Family Law Cases in the United States” in Sanford N Katz, John Eekelaar, and Mavis
Maclean, eds, Cross Currents: Family Law and Policy in the United States and England
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) 513 at 519-20.
13. See, for example, Leonard Edwards, “Comments on the Miller Commission Report: A California
Perspective” (2007) 27 Pace Law Review 627 at 631-2.
14. Deborah Hensler notes that mediation flourished in family dispute resolution before it did so in
other types of civil litigation. While Hensler criticizes excessive reliance on mandatory
mediation, she makes an exception for parenting cases. See Deborah R Hensler, “Suppose It’s
Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology” (2002) Journal of Dispute Resolution 81 at 82.
15. Linda Diebel, “Unqualified Mediators Prey on Broken Families,” Toronto Star (14 January 2008)
A1, quoting Toronto family lawyer Phillip Epstein.
16. Welsh, supra note 6 at 423.
17. Beck and Sales, supra note 3 at 7.
18. James Melamed, “Attorneys and Mediation: From Threat to Opportunity” (1989) 23 Mediation
Quarterly 13 at 15. Procedural rules of this nature can differ from county to county, but twenty
different American states had at least one mandatory mediation jurisdiction by 1993. Elrod and
Dale, supra note 12 at 29.
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orders the parties to participate.
19
In others, such as Australia, the parties must
mediate as a precondition to bringing an application.
20
In Que´bec, the parties
must attend a mediation information session in which the process is described.
21
While most court-connected and mandatory mediation programs deal exclusively
with parenting disputes, some also address financial issues between the separating
partners.
22
Some programs allow for the mediator to make recommendations to the
court in the event that the parties do not voluntarily settle.
23
The Feminist Critique of Mediation
The feminist critique of family law mediation focuses on the nature of power
imbalance and domestic violence within intimate relationships as well as the conse-
quences of these phenomena for dispute resolution. Most of the scholarship enunciat-
ing the feminist critique appeared between 1984 and 1995, soon after family
mediation started to becomewidespread. However, the central ideas have had signifi-
cant intellectual repercussions since the mid-1990s. The term “feminist” is used to
describe this critique, first, because it is especially (although not exclusively) attentive
to family mediation’s consequences for women. Second, like other feminist family
law scholarship, the critique critically scrutinizes claims of neutrality and privacy.
24
In summarizing this feminist critique of family mediation, this article will draw
broadly on negotiation, mediation, and family law scholarship, which helps eluci-
date power imbalance and domestic violence in the context of relationship break-
down.
25
There is a broad scholarly consensus about the reality of these
phenomena. However, different schools of thought emerge when mediation is
19. Rules of the Supreme Court (Newfoundland), 1986, SNL 1986, c 42, Sch D, R 37A: Court-
Ordered Mediation; Florida Statutes, s 44.102(c): “Court-ordered mediation.” Connie J Beck
et al, “Mediator Assessment, Documentation, and Disposition of Child Custody Cases
Involving Intimate Partner Abuse: A Naturalistic Evaluation of One County’s Practices” (2010)
34 Law and Human Behavior 227 at 228.
20. Family Law Act 1975, (Cth) (Australia), s 60I; Patrick Parkinson, Parenting after Separation: The
Process of Dispute Resolution in Australia, University of Sydney Law School Legal Research
Paper no 10/115 (2010), online: Social Science Research Network ,http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1702639. at 12.
21. Code of Civil Procedure (Quebec), Title IV, Chapter I, section 1, para 5: “Pre-hearing mediation”
at s 814.3 and 814.6. As in most jurisdictions with mandatory mediation, exemptions from the
requirement are available (s 814.10). See the discussion later in this article regarding
“screening out” inappropriate candidates from family mediation.
22. Jay Folberg, Ann Milne, and Peter Salem, “The Evolution of Divorce and Family Mediation: An
Overview” in Folberg, Milne, and Salem, supra note 6, 3 at 10.
23. Isolina Ricci, “Court-Based Mandatory Mediation,” in Folberg, Milne, and Salem, supra note 6,
397 at 407.
24. Katharine T Bartlett, “Feminism and Family Law” (1999) 3 Family Law Quarterly 475 at 475.
25. Much of this work was published after 1995. It is relevant to the themes of this article but is not
part of the feminist critique of family mediation per se. This is because the post-1995 scholarship
does not significantly add to the argument that the use of mediation for family law disputes should
be curtailed or ended.
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compared to adjudication and bipartite negotiation in terms of its ability to respond
to them and to protect the interests of vulnerable parties. Some champion adjudica-
tion over mediation, some argue for representative negotiation over mediation, and a
third group suggests that mediation may actually be better or no worse than its rivals
as a way to respond to the experience of women in intimate relationships.
Power Imbalance
The critique begins by observing that many conjugal heterosexual relationships
are characterized by a power imbalance in favour of the male party. Power is a
complex phenomenon that pervades all human relationships, including intimate
relationships between men and women.
26
Within a negotiation or mediation, power
can be defined simply as the ability to bring about desired outcomes.
27
In a typical
family law dispute, some of the desired outcomes are financial—paying less or
receiving more money. However, most family law disputes also include parenting
issues, with each party seeking more parenting time or parental decision-making
authority.
28
Carol Smart has observed that children and parenting are inevitably “a
nexus of power within family relations,” even if this fact sits uncomfortably with
our desire to think of parenting exclusively in terms of affection and nurturing.
29
The simple definition of power as the “ability to obtain something” requires elab-
oration if it is to be a helpful guide to what actually happens when ex-spouses par-
ticipate in mediation. Within mediation and negotiation studies, power is said to be
relational and contextual—it describes an interaction between people and depends
on the circumstances in which that interaction takes place.
30
The relative power
of the parties may fluctuate during a mediation, depending on which issue is
being discussed and the course of the interaction.
31
Empowerment, which is the
ability to obtain something, has been distinguished from the sense of entitlement,
which is the belief that one has a moral right to it.
32
The power to obtain something
26. Carol Smart, “Power and the Politics of Custody” in Carol Smart and Selma Sevenhuijsen, eds,
Child Custody and the Politics of Gender (New York: Routledge, 1989) 1 at 2.
27. Ilan G Gewurz, “(Re)Designing Mediation to Address the Nuances of Power Imbalance” (2001)
19 Conflict Resolution Quarterly 135 at 136; Robert S Adler and Elliot M Silverstein, “When
David Meets Goliath: Dealing with Power Differentials in Negotiations” (2000) 5 Harvard
Negotiation Law Review 1 at 8; Desmond Ellis and Noreen Stuckless, Mediating and
Negotiating Marital Conflicts (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996) at 5; Leroy J
Tornquist, “The Active Judge in Pretrial Settlement: Inherent Authority Gone Awry” (1989) 25
Willamette Law Review 743 at 760.
28. Noel Semple, “Whose Best Interests? Custody and Access Law and Procedure” (2010) 48
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 287 at 288-9, note 4.
29. Smart, supra note 26 at 1.
30. Diane Neumann, “How Mediation Can Effectively Address the Male-Female Power Imbalance in
Divorce” (1992) 9 Mediation Quarterly 227; Adler and Silverstein, supra note 27 at 9-12; Gewurz,
supra note 27 at 137.
31. Isolina Ricci, “Mediator’s Notebook: Reflections on Promoting Equal Empowerment and
Entitlements for Women” (1985) 8 Journal of Divorce 49 at 50.
32. Ibid at 50.
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in a negotiation is of little use if one does not feel that one is entitled to it and there-
fore does not ask for it.
If power is the ability to bring about desired outcomes, what factors give a
person power in a family mediation? The original feminist critique traced power
to resources.
33
The leading authors of the 1980s distinguished between “tangible
resources” (property and, in some formulations, education
34
) and “intangible
resources,” which was an umbrella term for anything other than property.
35
Subsequent scholarship suggests that intangible resources may actually be just as
important as tangible resources, or even more so, in determining a party’s ability
to achieve his or her goals in a mediation.
36
Desmond Ellis and Laurie Wight, for example, conducted a three-year longitudi-
nal study comparing mediation with lawyer negotiation as family dispute resolution
techniques.
37
They measured the parties’ tangible resources and the history of vio-
lence as well as the substantive outcomes. The intriguing finding was that neither
relative poverty in tangible resources nor having suffered domestic violence made
a party less likely to achieve her goals in mediation.
38
The authors responded by
developing a theory of interpersonal power in which resource possession was
only one factor, complemented by four others: “potential power, use of resources,
actual power, and convergence on outcomes.”
39
Other scholars have proposed alternative enumerations and categorizations of the
sources of power in negotiation or mediation.
40
Robert Mnookin and Lewis
Kornhauser proposed a five-factor bargaining model to explain why one spouse might
have a greater ability than the other to obtain favourable outcomes.
41
Three of their con-
tributors to power—risk tolerance, ability to withstand transaction costs, and willingness
to bluff—have especially clear potential to lead to imbalance and injustice.
42
Mnookin
argues that disparities inbargainingpowermight justify limits on thegeneral rightofdivor-
cing parties to resolve their own affairs without authoritative third-party intervention.
43
33. Michael Lang, “Understanding and Responding to Power in Mediation,” in Folberg, Milne, and
Salem, supra note 6, 209 at 213.
34. Gretchen M Walther, “Power Imbalances in Divorce Mediation” (2000) 14 American Journal of
Family Law 93 at 95.
35. See notes 52 to 55 in this article.
36. Neumann, supra note 30; Desmond Ellis and Laurie Wight, “Theorizing Power in Divorce
Negotiations: Implications for Practice” (1998) 15 Mediation Quarterly 227.
37. Ellis and Wight, supra note 36.
38. Ibid at 228.
39. Ibid at 230.
40. See, for example, Gewurz, supra note 27; Lang, supra note 33 at 211-12; John Wade, “Forms of
Power in Family Mediation and Negotiation” (1994) 8 Australian Journal of Family Law 40,
online: Bond University E-Publications ,http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1105&context=law_pubs..
41. RH Mnookin and L Kornhauser, “Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce”
(1979) 88 Yale Law Journal 950 at 966-73; Robert H Mnookin, “Divorce Bargaining: The Limits
on Private Ordering” (1985) 18 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 1015 at 1024.
42. Ibid at 1024-6.
43. Ibid at 1036-7.
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Another theory of power in negotiations was suggested by Ilan Gewurz. Gewurz
reviewed the literature’s “numerous laundry lists” of negotiating power factors and
formulated his own with a view to helping mediators respond appropriately.
44
At the
top level of Gewurz’s classification scheme is a distinction between (1) “dispute-
specific power dynamics” and (2) “the relationship context.”
45
While these terms
are not explicitly defined, numerous examples and sub-types of each are provided.
The “relationship context” group includes sources of power that would both operate
during the life of an intimate relationship and persist into the negotiation of its dis-
solution. For example, patterns of deference or gender roles that create power imbal-
ance in a divorce mediation would be familiar to the parties from the experience of
their marriage. A wife who has never had any role in financial decision making
during her marriage is likely to be disempowered by this aspect of the relationship
context when negotiating the financial aspects of a divorce with her husband. To
exemplify this type of power imbalance, Gewurz describes a scenario in which a
husband has been the breadwinner and decision maker in the marriage and is
also more educated and confident.
46
By contrast, Gewurz’s “dispute-specific” group of power factors includes
phenomena that might only become concrete after divorce negotiations begin.
Subdivided into “procedural” and “substantive” groups, it includes items such as
eloquence, negotiating skills, single-mindedness, and “coercive and reward
power.”
47
Gewurz’s effort to propose specific mediator interventions to respond
to specific forms of power imbalance will be reviewed later in this article.
The feminist critique suggests that the male party will usually have more power
than the female party after the dissolution of the average heterosexual intimate
relationship. The first source of male power is tangible resource imbalances. On
average, men earn higher incomes and possess more property than women,
making them wealthier at the time of the relationship dissolution.
48
Wealth
creates power because the poorer party in a mediation may be more willing to
settle for less due to a greater fear of proceeding to trial or a greater immediate
need for the financial settlement.
49
Empirical research with divorcing parties has
found that people who are more impatient to settle often sacrifice financial
44. Gewurz, supra note 27.
45. Ibid at 146.
46. Ibid at 156-7.
47. Ibid at 146.
48. Kathleen A Lahey, “Women, Substantive Equality, and Fiscal Policy: Gender-Based Analysis of
Taxes, Benefits, and Budgets” (2010) 22 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 27 at 28;
Gillian Ranson, “Paid and Unpaid Work: How Do Families Divide Their Labour?” in Maureen
Baker, ed, Families: Changing Trends in Canada, 5th edition (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson,
2005) 99.
49. Penelope E Bryan, “Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power” (1992) 40
Buffalo Law Review 441 at 456; Tornquist, supra note 27 at 760.
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entitlements in order to do so.
50
Many women entitled to child or spousal support
from male ex-partners are in exactly this position.
51
Victims of abuse may also have
an intense need to put the relationship behind them as quickly as possible.
Beyond dollars and cents, intangible resource imbalances may also assist men in
divorce mediation and negotiation, according to the feminist critique.
52
Status, dom-
inance, self-esteem, and reward expectation are among the ‘resources’ that men are
more likely than women to bring into family mediation.
53
Conversely, women may
be more likely to arrive with psychological impediments such as depression, fear of
achievement, and guilt arising from the end of the relationship.
54
Martha Shaffer
suggests that mothers may have more difficulty than fathers do in distinguishing
their own interests from those of their children.
55
Resources and impediments of
this nature contribute to disparities in “persuasive strength.”
56
Desmond Ellis and
Noreen Stuckless define this term as “power in use” or the “motivation and
ability to use these resources to bring about a desired convergence on outcomes.”
57
In short, the will to win, or lack thereof, is likely to play a role in power imbalances.
Experimental psychology studies have found that, when a quantifiable resource
is being divided through negotiation, the average female subject will ask for, expect,
and receive a slightly smaller share than will the average male subject.
58
It has also
been proposed that women tend to have more “expressive,” rather than
50. Howard S Erlanger, Elizabeth Chambliss, and Marygold S Melli, “Participation and Flexibility in
Informal Process: Cautions from the Divorce Context” (1987) 21 Law and Society Review 585 at
597. In their interviews with divorce litigants, the authors also found that a “number of women
report that they accepted poor settlement terms because their husbands were threatening
custody battles.”
51. See, for example, Mnookin, supra note 41 at 1029-30.
52. Bryan, supra note 49 at 457; Nancy Ilman Meyers, “Power (Im)Balance and the Failure of
Impartiality in Attorney-Mediated Divorce” (1996) 27 University of Toledo Law Review 853 at
864-5.
53. Cheryl Regehr suggests that men and women bring different expectations to the bargaining table
and that this difference operates to the detriment of women. Cheryl Regehr, “The Use of
Empowerment in Child Custody Mediation: A Feminist Critique” (1994) 11 Mediation
Quarterly 361 at 364. For accounts of how risk aversion and other attitudes towards negotiation
can affect divorce outcomes, see Kirsten Sandberg, “Best Interests and Justice” in Carol Smart
and Selma Sevenhuijsen, eds, Child Custody and the Politics of Gender (New York:
Routledge, 1989) 100 at 105; Mnookin and Kornhauser, supra note 41.
54. Meyers, supra note 52 at 864-5; Trina Grillo, “The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for
Women” (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 1545 at 1579.
55. Martha Shaffer, “Divorce Mediation: A Feminist Perspective” (1988) 46 University of Toronto
Faculty of Law Review 162 at 181.
56. Desmond Ellis and Noreen Stuckless, Mediating and Negotiating Marital Conflicts (Toronto:
Sage, 1996) at 5.
57. Ibid.
58. Catherine Eckel, Angela CM de Oliveira, and Philip J Grossman, “Gender and Negotiation in the
Small: Are Women (Perceived to Be) More Cooperative Than Men?” (2008) 24 Negotiation
Journal 429 at 441. Deborah M Kolb, “Too Bad for the Women or Does It Have to Be?
Gender and Negotiation Research over the Past Twenty-Five Years” (2009) 25 Negotiation
Journal 515 at 520, observes that the gender disparity in negotiated outcomes is most
pronounced when the parties are negotiating over a single financial issue. In the family
context, this could occur (for example) in a case with no parenting issues.
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“instrumental,” traits and that they are more likely than men are to see themselves as
“interdependent” rather than “independent.”
59
However, empirical evidence for
these propositions, and for their effects on negotiated or mediated outcomes, is
inconsistent.
60
Much of the recent scholarship about gender and negotiation
focuses on organizations and workplaces, and there is a dearth of recent empirical
studies testing these theories in the family law context.
61
Domestic Violence
Violence is a feature of 50-80 percent of the conjugal relationships that dis-
solve before death
62
and of 50-60 percent of those relationships that come to
mediation.
63
Women are much more likely than men to be victims of the more
severe forms of domestic violence.
64
One estimate is that almost one-third of
women are subjected to physical assault at the hands of an intimate partner at
some point during their lives.
65
Restraining and protection orders become important
issues in the numerous cases that involve domestic violence, in addition to money
and parenting. However, violence can severely impede the victim’s ability to assert
her rights and interests against the perpetrator.
66
Like power, domestic violence has also undergone a period of elaboration and
categorization inspired by the feminist critique of family mediation.
67
Many such
59. Noa Nelson, Adi Zarankin, and Rachel Ben-Ari, “Transformative Women, Problem-Solving Men?
Not Quite: Gender and Mediators’ Perceptions of Mediation” (2010) Negotiation Journal 287 at
290.
60. Ibid at 291.
61. See, for example, Kolb, supra note 58; Catherine H Tinsley et al, “Women at the Bargaining
Table: Pitfalls and Prospects” (2009) 25 Negotiation Journal 233.
62. Jessica Pearson, “Mediating When Domestic Violence Is a Factor: Policies and Practices in Court-
Based Divorce Mediation Programs” (1997) 14 Mediation Quarterly 319 at 320; Kelly, supra note
7 at 9; Desmond Ellis, “Divorce and the Family Court: What Can Be Done about Domestic
Violence?” (2008) 46 Family Court Review 531 at 531.
63. Robin H Ballard et al, “Factors Affecting the Outcome of Divorce and Paternity Mediations”
(2011) 49 Family Court Review 16 at 17; Amy Holtzworth-Munroe, “Controversies in Divorce
Mediation and Intimate Partner Violence: A Focus on the Children” (2011) 16 Aggression and
Violent Behavior 319 at 319.
64. Wiegers and Keet, supra note 5 at 736-7; Joan B Kelly and Michael P Johnson, “Differentiation
among Types of Intimate Partner Violence: Research Update and Implications for Interventions”
(2008) 46 Family Court Review 476 at 482.
65. Nancy Ver Steegh, “Yes, No, and Maybe: Informed Decision Making about Divorce Mediation in
the Presence of Domestic Violence” (2003) 9 William and Mary Journal of Women and the Law
145 at 149.
66. Barbara J Hart, “Gentle Jeopardy: The Further Endangerment of Battered Women and Children in
Custody Mediation” (1990) 7 Mediation Quarterly 317 at 318.
67. For different typologies of domestic violence, see Kelly and Johnson, supra note 64; Ellis and
Stuckless, supra note 56; Barbara Jo Fidler et al, eds, Challenging Issues in Child Custody
Disputes: A Guide for Legal and Mental Health Professionals (Toronto: Thomson Carswell,
2008) at 98-101; Nicholas Bala and Rachel Birnbaum, “Toward the Differentiation of High-
Conflict Families: An Analysis of Social Science Research and Canadian Case Law” (2010) 48
Family Court Review 403 at 411-12.
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efforts categorize violence on the basis of the aggressor’s motivations, which can
include coercion, self-defence, or mental illness.
68
Not all violence is equal, and
some family violence may have relatively little effect on negotiating power.
69
The effect of a single violent act on a party’s ability to negotiate depends substan-
tially on the relationship context.
70
However, the literature has established clearly
that the species of domestic violence identified as “coercive controlling violence”
or “patriarchal terrorism” can produce or exacerbate power imbalance.
71
Some
such relationships include a “culture of violence” in which systematic abuse
leads to the total domination of the abuser over the victim.
72
It can also be especially
difficult for the victim to assert her rights and interests if doing so during the
relationship was a trigger for violent retaliation.
73
What are the consequences of domestic violence for family mediation? Like
other dispute resolution processes without an authoritative decision maker,
mediation may also allow criminal violence to go unpunished. The reality of the
abuse may become merely a fact or claim to be traded against others within the
negotiation.
74
Mediation in a custody or access case is typically “future-oriented,”
focusing primarily or exclusively on parenting arrangements going forward.
Violence may thus be treated as a page in the parties’ history, and this is a book
that they are encouraged to close.
75
Mediators may also be too quick to see domestic
violence as a manifestation of conflict, rather than as a manifestation of control and
domination.
76
Martha Shaffer cites evidence that many 1980s family mediators even
believed that the victims should bear some of the blame for the violence.
77
Finally,
if mediation occurs in an environment that is less secure than a courthouse, it may
68. Nancy Ver Steegh and Clare Dalton, “Report from the Wingspread Conference on Domestic
Violence and Family Courts” (2008) 46 Family Court Review 454 at 458-9.
69. Roselle Wissler, “Family Law Mediation” (1999) 6 Dispute Resolution Magazine 29; Pearson,
supra note 62 at 324.
70. Steegh and Dalton, supra note 68 at 456-7.
71. Michael P Johnson, “Patriarchal Terrorism and Common Couple Violence: Two Forms of
Violence against Women” (1995) 57 Journal of Marriage and Family; Michael P Johnson,
“Gender and Types of Intimate Partner Violence: A Response to an Anti-Feminist Literature
Review” (2011) 16 Aggression and Violent Behavior 289.
72. Beck and Sales, supra note 3 at 28.
73. N Zoe Hilton, “Mediating Wife Assault: Battered Women and the ‘New Family’” (1991) 9
Canadian Journal of Family Law 29 at 35; Hilary Astor, “The Weight of Silence: Talking
about Violence in Family Mediation” in Margaret Thornton ed, Public and Private: Feminist
Debates (Melbourne, Australia: Oxford University Press, 1995) 174 at 180.
74. Lisa G Lerman, “Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute
Resolution on Women” (1984) 7 Harvard Women’s Law Journal 57 at 72.
75. Martha J Bailey, “Unpacking the Rational Alternative: A Critical Review of Family Mediation
Movement Claims” (1989) 8 Canadian Journal of Family Law 61 at 69; Regehr, supra note 53
at 364; Hilton, supra note 73 at 37.
76. Karla Fischer, Neil Vidmar, and Rene Ellis, “The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation
in Domestic Violence Cases” (1993) 46 Southern Methodist University Law Review 2117.
77. Shaffer, supra note 55 at 183.
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expose victims to a higher risk of actual physical harm from the perpetrators.
78
The
risk of violent assault is especially high in the period immediately following
separation.
79
The Relative Merits of Mediation and Its Alternatives
Concerns about power imbalance and domestic violence are foundational com-
ponents of the feminist critique of family mediation, but there is less consensus about
themerits of different dispute resolution options in responding to these realities. Some
scholars are skeptical of both mediation and traditional bipartite negotiation. These
authors point to the need for authoritative adjudication by a neutral third party,
generally a judge. In the last four decades of the twentieth century, family law
reform has given women substantial new entitlements and protections.
80
A court
(or perhaps an authoritative arbitrator bound by law) is required in principle to
apply the law. Conversely, mediated and negotiated resolutions need not necessarily
reflect what the law would provide or be objectively fair.
81
They require only assent
from both parties, however reluctant or disempowered one of the parties may be.
Both one-on-one negotiation and mediation can be seen as forms of “privatiza-
tion” of the divorce process, which have the negative effect of “removing it from the
influence and interference of both social and legal scrutiny.”
82
Susan Boyd suggests
that these techniques create a private space in which men’s resource advantages can
be used to maximum effect.
83
In a similar vein, Penelope Bryan argues that informal
78. Jessica Pearson, Divorce Mediation and Domestic Violence (Rockville, MD: National Criminal
Justice Reference Service (NCJRS), 1997), online: NCJRS ,http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/grants/164658.pdf.; Pearson, supra note 62; Astor, supra note 73 at 179.
79. Beck and Sales, supra note 3 at 30.
80. Laurie Woods, “Mediation: A Backlash to Women’s Progress on Family Law Issues” (1985) 19
Clearinghouse Review 431.
81. Galanter and Cahill, supra note 8 at 1364. Whether the “objectively fair” outcome is that which
reflects as much as possible the one that a court would provide is a matter of debate. See, for
example, Craig A McEwen, Nancy H Rogers, and Richard J Maiman, “Bring in the Lawyers:
Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation” (1995) 79
Minnesota Law Review 1317 at 1327; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, “Whose Dispute Is It
Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases)” (1995) 83
Georgetown Law Journal 2663.
82. Susan B Boyd, Child Custody, Law, and Women’s Work (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press
Canada, 2003) at 223. Regarding the “familial ideology” of privacy and its harmony with
mediation as a dispute resolution technique, see Elizabeth Pickett, “Familial Ideology, Family
Law and Mediation: Law Casts More Than a ‘Shadow’ ” (1991) 3 Journal of Human Justice
27 at 30-1.
83. Ibid. See also Sandra A Goundry, Rosalind Currie, and Yvonne Peters, Family Mediation in
Canada: Implications for Women’s Equality (Ottawa: Status of Women Canada, 1998), online:
Depository Service Program (Government of Canada) ,http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/
Collection/SW21-30-1998E.pdf. at 39-40. See also Ann Bottomley, “What Is Happening to
Family Law? A Feminist Critique of Conciliation” in Julia Brophy and Carol Smart, eds,
Women in Law: Explorations in Law, Family and Sexuality (London: Routledge, 1985) 165 at
179.
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settlement systems de-emphasize “law’s ability to constrain power abuses and
ensures that pre-existing power disparities, rather than law, will dictate divorce
agreement’s terms.”
84
In practical terms, removing a dispute from the litigation
process may make it much more difficult to obtain full disclosure of the wealthier
party’s assets and to prevent their dissipation.
85
If private resolutions are less fre-
quently subject to later challenge by the parties than are adjudicated ones, this dis-
crepancy might be explained not by greater satisfaction but, rather, by the fact that
their confidential and unrecorded nature gives exploited parties no documentary
basis for challenging them.
86
The feminist argument for adjudication in family law also highlights the issue of
mediator bias.
87
The experimental psychology literature has found that gender
stereotypes—expectations of differential behaviour from men and women in nego-
tiating contexts—are much stronger than the actual differences in behaviour.
88
Although there is little evidence specific to the family mediation context, it is plaus-
ible that mediators also hold gender stereotypes. N. Zoe Hilton has suggested that a
family mediator might expect the woman to be more conciliatory and therefore stra-
tegically focus efforts on obtaining concessions from her in order to maximize the
prospects for settlement.
89
A stereotypical mediator expectation that a woman will
prioritize parenting could impede her ability to obtain desired financial outcomes,
such as ownership of a business in which both spouses participated before the
relationship dissolved (conversely, the same mediator gender stereotype could
favour the woman over the man in a parenting dispute).
Of course, any third party involved in a family law case, including a judge,
may be biased or hold gender stereotypes. However, Tina Grillo and Nancy
Illman Meyers argue that adjudication provides procedural safeguards against
judicial bias, such as cross-examination and appeal.
90
Mediation and negotiation
procedures are not evaluated against the requirements of procedural fairness.
91
A
mediator, unlike a judge, enters a “risky relationship of informality and apparent
intimacy with the parties,” which can foster bias in decision making.
92
Making
mediation mandatory deprives the parties of choice regarding whether to enter
84. Bryan, supra note 49 at 522.
85. Woods, supra note 80 at 435; Hilton, supra note 75 at 34.
86. Regehr, supra note 53 at 363.
87. Cornelia Brentano and Alison Clarke-Stewart, Divorce: Causes and Consequences (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2006) at 131.
88. Eckel, Oliveira, and Grossman, supra note 58 at 440-2.
89. Hilton, supra note 73 at 36.
90. Meyers, supra note 52 at 870-1; Richard Delgado et al, “Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the
Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution” (1985) 1985 Wisconsin Law Review 1359 at
1367-75.
91. Trevor Farrow, “Public Justice, Private Dispute Resolution and Democracy” in Ronalda Murphy
and Patrick A Molinari, eds, Doing Justice: Dispute Resolution in the Courts and Beyond (Ottawa:
Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice, 2009), online: Social Science Research
Network ,http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1167702. at 48-50.
92. Grillo, supra note 54 at 1589.
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this relationship and may exacerbate the risks posed by power imbalance and
domestic violence.
93
Critics of private settlement have called attention to adjudication’s public
benefits, such as creating precedents and moving the law forward.
94
Litigation
has played a key part in many family law reform victories for women, either by
developing the law in women’s interests
95
or by acting as a catalyst for legislative
reform.
96
Going forward, negotiated or mediated settlements are unlikely to serve
either of these law reform functions.
97
Ruth Phegan observes that, unlike mediation,
the adversarial system has at least the potential to bring “formal attention . . . to
gender, race, class and other discriminatory bases which determine the family.”
98
These arguments for public and formal dispute resolution tend to favour adjudi-
cation over either mediation or bipartite negotiation.
99
However, in comparing the
latter two options, some feminist critics suggest that mediation is actually worse
for women than bipartite negotiation. Across Canada, approximately 40 percent
of family litigants have the benefit of legal counsel, and the rate of representation
is higher in many other jurisdictions.
100
A spouse represented by a lawyer would
93. Ibid at 1596.
94. See, for example, David Luban, “Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm” (1995) 83
Georgetown Law Journal 2619 at 2622–6; Farrow, supra note 91 at 48.
95. An example of the former phenomenon is Moge v Moge, (1992) 3 SCR 813, 43 RFL (3d) 345,
which introduced the “compensatory” principle to the law of spousal support and led to more
generous awards. See Carol Rogerson, “Spousal Support after Moge” (1996) 14 Canadian
Family Law Quarterly 281.
96. For example, Murdoch v Murdoch (1973), [1975] 1 SCR 423, which generated substantial public
outrage and led to property law reform. Mysty S Clapton, “Murdoch v Murdoch: The Organizing
Narrative of Matrimonial Property Law Reform” (2008) 20 Canadian Journal of Women and the
Law 197; Robert Leckey, Contextual Subjects: Family, State and Relational Theory (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2008).
97. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 81 at 2678-82, for a thoughtful elaboration of, and response to,
this argument.
98. Ruth Phegan, “The Family Mediation System: An Art of Distributions” (1995) 40 McGill Law
Journal 365 at 386.
99. Writing in 1991, Elizabeth Pickett found that most feminist critics of family mediation had
“concluded that in general the legal process provides a more appropriate and effective
instrument for the protection of the rights of individual women than mediation.” Pickett, supra
note 82 at 27.
100. Office of Strategic Planning and Performance Management (Evaluation Division), The Unified
Family Court Summative Evaluation Final Report (Ottawa: Deptartment of Justice Canada,
2009), online: Department of Justice Canada ,http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/eval/rep-rap/
09/ufc-tuf/ufc.pdf. at 19. The number of self-represented litigants has increased substantially
in recent years in Ontario. This phenomenon is in large part a consequence of the
unaffordability of family lawyers to most people and cut-backs to state-funded civil legal aid
programs. Nicholas Bala and Rachel Birnbaum, “Family Litigants without Lawyers: Study
Documents Growing Challenges for the Justice System,” Lawyers Weekly (5 August 2011),
online: Lawyers Weekly ,http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section=article&volume=
31&number=12&article=2.); DA Rollie Thompson and Lynn Reierson, “A Practicing
Lawyer’s Field Guide to the Unrepresented” (2002) 19 Canadian Family Law Quarterly 529 at
529-30; Anne-Marie Langan, “Threatening the Balance of the Scales of Justice: Unrepresented
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generally have that lawyer conduct private negotiations on her behalf. However,
mediation culture, and mediators themselves, may encourage or require the
parties to attend without counsel.
101
(Mediators may oppose lawyer involvement
because it reduces the scope for party self-determination
102
or because the presence
of lawyers reduces the likelihood of agreement in mediation.)
103
Excluding her
lawyer leaves the weaker party without a valuable ally and may thereby foster
exploitation.
104
For this and other reasons, Penelope Bryan concludes that
“mediation unobtrusively reduces [the law’s] threat to patriarchy by returning
men to their former dominant position.”
105
One family law-specific factor mentioned by many of mediation’s feminist
critics pertains to parenting disputes.
106
Mediators are likely to favour joint
custody as a substantive outcome.
107
Feminist child custody scholarship has ident-
ified a natural ideological harmony between joint custody and family mediation,
which came of age contemporaneously.
108
Joint custody or equally shared parenting
also constitute simple forms of equality between the spouses, which can be pre-
sented to the parties as a good compromise.
However, feminists argue that joint custody is often contrary to women’s inter-
ests, usually because (1) the alternative would be sole custody for the mother; and
(2) a sole custody order would mean more freedom and child support income for the
mother.
109
Bryan also suggests that joint custody “perpetuates the pre-existing
patriarchal family structure by . . . solidifying the ex-husband’s power over impor-
tant child related decisions.”
110
Joint custody in cases of domestic violence has
101. McEwen, Rogers, and Maiman, supra note 81 at 1331 and 1354-5. Martha Fineman sees the
exclusion of lawyers from mediation as part of a “rhetorical war” between the “helping
professions” and lawyers. Martha Fineman, “Dominant Discourse, Professional Language and
Legal Change in Child Custody Decision-Making” (1988) 101 Harvard Law Review 727 at 746.
102. Welsh, supra note 6 at 425.
103. Ballard et al, supra note 63 at 21.
104. Boyd, supra note 82 at 199.
105. Bryan, supra note 49 at 441-4 and 519-20.
106. Bailey, supra note 75 at 76.
107. Carol Bohmer and Marilyn L Ray, “Effects of Different Dispute Resolution Methods on Women
and Children after Divorce” (1994) 28 Family Law Quarterly 223 at 227; Linda K Girdner,
“Custody Mediation in the United States: Empowerment or Social Control?” (1989) 3
Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 134 at 142; Howard H Irving and Michael
Benjamin, Family Mediation: Contemporary Issues (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications,
1995) at 131; CJ Richardson, Court-Based Divorce Mediation in Four Canadian Cities: An
Overview of Research Results (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 1988) at 34-5.
108. Fineman, supra note 101 at 732. Fineman argues that the introduction of mandatory mediation
was actually a procedural mask for a substantive legal change making joint custody the norm.
Fineman also suggests that mediators have a pecuniary interest in joint custody, insofar as it
requires an ongoing family-restructuring process, which leads to more demand for mediators’
services (at 730-1). See also Pickett, supra note 82 at 30-2 and 38; Phegan, supra note 98 at
388-96.
109. Regehr, supra note 53 at 365-6.
110. Bryan, supra note 49 at 494-5; Fineman, supra note 101 at 758; Smart, supra note 26.
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come in for particular criticism, due to its potential to perpetuate abuse and
control.
111
Another group of scholars has echoed the core observations regarding power
imbalance and domestic violence, without seeing them as reasons to prefer
mediation’s alternatives.
112
Janet Rifkin applauds mediation’s “emphasis on the
female concerns of responsibility and justice” as an alternative to the “male”
focus on individual rights.
113
In a recent article in this journal about women
mediator heroes in film, Jennifer Schulz considers mediation as a feminist alterna-
tive to patriarchal law.
114
Cathleen Grey and Susan B. Merrick suggest that
courtroom divorce litigation is disadvantageous to women because “the legal
system is fundamentally familiar and analogous to how men are socialized and is
unfamiliar and alien to how women are socialized.”
115
They suggest that mediation
might speak in “a female voice” in contrast to litigation.
116
Mary Adkins claims that
we should not push domestic violence victims into formal divorce litigation, given
the well-known financial burdens and process trauma that it involves.
117
Instead, she
proposes an evaluative, caucus form of family mediation to be used in domestic
violence cases.
118
Linda Girdner argues that family mediation can represent either negative “social
control” or positive “empowerment” for vulnerable spouses, and she suggests how
it can take the latter form.
119
For example, when a party is disempowered by a lack
of legal information—for example, regarding her legal entitlement to child and
spousal support—the mediator can provide the information and the power along
with it. Girdner takes it for granted that mediators usually favour joint custody or
shared parenting, and she suggests that empowering mediators avoid imposing
this view upon the parties.
120
Some in this camp cite empirical evidence shedding doubt on the hypothesis that
mediation produces worse outcomes for women than litigation does. In a 1988 com-
parison of divorce mediation programs in four Canadian courts, C.J. Richardson
found that support awards were actually 22 percent higher in mediated cases than
111. Pearson, supra note 62 at 320; Hart, supra note 66 at 325-6; Hilton, supra note 75 at 36-7.
112. Michael Benjamin and Howard H Irving, “Toward a Feminist-Informed Model of Therapeutic
Family Mediation” (1992) 10 Mediation Quarterly 129 at 130.
113. Janet Rifkin, “Mediation from a Feminist Perspective: Promise and Problems” (1984) 2 Law and
Inequality 21 at 25.
114. Jennifer L Schulz, “The Cook, the Mediator, the Feminist, and the Hero” (2009) 21 Canadian
Journal of Women and the Law 177.
115. Cathleen Gray and Susan B Merrick, “Voice Alterations: Why Women Have More Difficulty
Than Men with the Legal Process of Divorce” (1996) 34 Family Court Review 240 at 242.
116. Ibid at 246.
117. Mary Adkins, “Moving out of the 1990s: An Argument for Updating Protocol on Divorce
Mediation in Domestic Abuse Cases” (2010) 22 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 97 at
125-8.
118. Ibid at 130.
119. Girdner, supra note 107 at 147-8.
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they were in non-mediated cases.
121
In a more recent American study, Mary Marcus
and her colleagues compared 200 divorce files that had been litigated against 200
that had been mediated. In the mediated cases, women received the same average
amount of parenting time and spousal support as well as larger property and
child support awards compared to those who litigated.
122
Carol Bohmer and Marilyn L. Ray reached more ambiguous conclusions in their
comparison of mediated, lawyer-negotiated, and adjudicated divorces in New York
State and Georgia.
123
In New York State, women tended to receive less child
support in mediated outcomes, although with regard to asset distribution they
fared better than they did under adjudication.
124
In Georgia, however, none of the
measured outcomes for women were worse under mediation than they were
under the alternatives.
125
The authors tentatively attribute this difference to (1)
the fact that Georgia had then (like Canada has today) firm child support guidelines;
and (2) the fact that mediators in Georgia were more likely to have legal training.
126
There is evidence that the primary feature distinguishing mediated post-separation
parenting arrangements from adjudicated ones is not that they are more or less favour-
able to women but, rather, that they are more detailed.
127
It appears that women who mediate their family disputes are at least as satisfied
with the experience as are those who resolve them in other ways.
128
In one recent
survey, Ohio family court litigants were asked to indicate their satisfaction with
various types of court services on a scale of one to seven. Female respondents
gave mediation a mean score of 5.82, which was markedly higher than female sat-
isfaction with attorneys (2.69) and judges (4.07) and also slightly higher than the
mean satisfaction rating given to mediation by male respondents (5.53).
129
Although one early study found that mediation was more satisfactory to men
than it was to women,
130
the preponderance of evidence now suggests that either
the opposite is true
131
or that there is no gender difference.
132
121. Richardson, supra note 107 at 32. However, there was also some more ambiguous evidence that
compliance was lower in mediated cases. Mediation also produced more joint custody orders and
fewer sole maternal custody orders.
122. Marcus et al, supra note 10 at 147.
123. Bohmer and Ray, supra note 107.
124. Ibid at 232.
125. Ibid at 244.
126. Ibid at 245.
127. Pearson, supra note 12 at 519; Richardson, supra note 107 at 37.
128. Adkins, supra note 117 at 116.
129. Randall W Leite and Kathleen Clark, “Participants’ Evaluations of Aspects of the Legal Child
Custody Process and Preferences for Court Services” (2007) 45 Family Court Review 260 at 265.
130. Robert E Emery, Sheila G Matthews, and Melissa M Wyer, “Child Custody Mediation and
Litigation: Further Evidence on the Differing Views of Mothers and Fathers” (1991) 59
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 410.
131. Galanter and Cahill, supra note 81 at 1357; Marcus et al, supra note 10 at 145.
132. Lori Anne Shaw, “Divorce Mediation Outcome Research: A Meta-Analysis” (2010) 27 Conflict
Resolution Quarterly 447 at 448; Administrative Office of the Courts (California), “Snapshot
Study 2008: Summary Findings,” Research Update, online: Administrative Office of the
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The feminist literature on family mediation is characterized by substantial
consensus, despite differences of opinion regarding the relative merits of dispute-
resolution options. It is widely agreed that (1) intimate relationships often involve
power imbalance and violence and that (2) these facts have an impact on dispute
resolution at the time of intimate relationship dissolution. Feminists have taken
the lead in articulating this critique, but it is harmonious with insights from other
areas of dispute resolution scholarship. Anyone who seeks to negotiate a resolution
from a position of weakness may end up with less than the law would give.
Differences in race, class, or education level, as well as gender, can compound
the disadvantage.
133
Intimate relationships and the domestic violence that can
accompany them have the potential to produce power imbalances and unjust
results in negotiations. These imbalances are exacerbated by the pervasive lack of
legal representation in family law cases, which mediation may encourage.
Mediation Adapts in Response to the Critique
If family mediation tends to avoid the worst case scenario for women, which
some of its early critics feared, this result may in part be due to the response of
mediation scholars and practitioners to the feminist critique. Family mediation prac-
tice now responds to power imbalance and violence in two ways. First, inappropri-
ate cases are “screened out” of mediation and directed to litigation instead. Second,
innovative mediator practices have evolved for dealing with power imbalance and
domestic violence in those family cases that are still mediated. Assessing the
extent to which these adaptations have penetrated the average Canadian private
family mediation practice would require an empirical inquiry that is beyond the
scope of this article. However, the practice literature and the guideline documents
for court-adjunct family mediation show a widespread and concerted effort to
adjust in response to the feminist critique.
Identifying Power Imbalance and Violence
The feminist critique has spurred practical efforts to better identify power
imbalance and violence within a potential mediation case. During the 1990s, ob-
servers reported that mediators were becoming more cognizant of these issues,
which was in of itself a step forward.
134
The literature of this decade focused on
Courts (California) ,http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/Snapshot_2008_summary_findings_
FINAL_Oct11_update.pdf. at 21.
133. However, Evangelina Holvino has argued that women of colour are less likely to perceive family
and patriarchy as sites of oppression than white women are. Evangelina Holvino, “Intersections:
The Simultaneity of Race, Gender and Class in Organization Studies” (2010) 17 Gender, Work
and Organization 248 at 253-4.
134. Pearson, supra note 62 at 324-5.
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building the capacity of family mediators to recognize power imbalance and
domestic violence.
135
However, doubts remained about the ability of mediators to
detect these phenomena on an ad hoc basis.
136
The focus therefore gradually shifted to the development of formal screening and
triage tools.
137
Linda Girdner’s groundbreaking 1990 Conflict Assessment Protocol
(CAP) was perhaps the first feminist-influenced tool to be published.
138
In separate
sessions with each spouse, a mediator using CAP would ask probing questions
about (1) decision making, conflict, and anger within the relationship; and (2)
specific abusive behaviours. Ellis and Stuckless’s 2006 Domestic Violence
Evaluation (DOVE) is a mediator-administered interview that reflects theoretical
and descriptive research advances subsequent to Girdner’s work.
139
DOVE dis-
tinguishes between, and tests for, both control-motivated and conflict-instigated
violence, which have very different consequences for family mediation practice.
140
DOVE is “research-based,” insofar as it focuses on empirically verified predictors
of violence and helps identify a safety plan that specifically responds to them. A
somewhat similar screen that evaluates risk of assault is the Domestic Violence
Screening Instrument (DVSI-R), which has been in use in Connecticut family
courts since 2003.
141
The Mediator’s Assessment of Safety Issues and Concerns (MASIC) is perhaps
most fully responsive to the feminist critique, insofar as it includes questions that
focus on power imbalance even if they are unaccompanied by violence. MASIC
is designed to be administered as an oral interview with parents who are family
135. Jennifer P Maxwell, “The Use of Performance Art and Q Methodology for Increasing Mediator
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Research” (2004) 22 Conflict Resolution Quarterly 37, regarding shifting priorities in family
mediation research.
138. Linda K Girdner, “Mediation Triage: Screening for Spouse Abuse in Divorce Mediation” (1990)
7 Mediation Quarterly 365. It was predated by assessment tools that were more focused on
determining whether or not mediation would successfully produce an agreement. For example,
Ngoh Tiong Tan, “Developing and Testing a Family Mediation Assessment Instrument”
(1988) 19 Mediation Quarterly 53.
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See, for example, Peter G Jaffe, Claire V Crooks, and Nick Bala, “A Framework for Addressing
Allegations of Domestic Violence in Child Custody Disputes” (2009) 6 Journal of Child Custody
169 at 504-5; Joan B Kelly and Michael P Johnson, “Differentiation among Types of Intimate
Partner Violence: Research Update and Implications for Interventions” (2008) 46 Family
Court Review 476 at 481.
141. Peter Salem, Debra Kulak, and Robin Deutsch, “Triaging Family Court Services: The
Connecticut Judicial Branch’s Family Civil Intake Screen” (2007) 27 Pace Law Review 741
at 757.
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mediation candidates. Each parent is interviewed privately. MASIC asks direct
questions about violence—for example, asking each spouse: “Did the other
parent ever . . . push, shove, shake or grab you?”
142
Other questions are designed
to assess future risks—for example: “Does the other parent own or have access
to any weapons?”
143
MASIC looks for evidence of coercive control and power
imbalance by asking questions about decision making and power within the
relationship.
144
Most family courts in Canada and the United States now administer these written
or oral interviews to potential mediation participants,
145
often supplemented by
background checks and clinical observations.
146
Some, such as Connecticut’s
Family Civil Intake Screen, evaluate domestic violence as part of a broader
inquiry designed to determine what services will be most effective for a given
family.
147
The evolution of tools to evaluate violence and power imbalance in
family mediation settings can clearly be credited to the feminist critique outlined
earlier.
Responding to Violence
What do court staff and mediators do with the information generated by
screening and triage? Most mediators now accept that sufficiently severe power
imbalance or domestic violence makes a case inappropriate for family mediation.
148
They also generally agree that power imbalance and domestic violence are highly
relevant in determining whether mediation is appropriate and that some or all
such cases with these characteristics should be “screened out.”
149
Some argue
that any domestic violence makes a case inappropriate for family mediation.
150
By the mid-1990s, many jurisdictions were excluding domestic violence cases
from mandatory mediation requirements.
151
In Australia, for example,
142. Holtzworth-Munroe, Beck, and Applegate, supra note 136 at 658.
143. Ibid at 657.
144. Ibid at 656.
145. Ver Steegh and Dalton, supra note 68 at 460.
146. Pearson, supra note 62 at 325.
147. Salem, Kulak, and Deutsch, supra note 141 at 751, 754, and 760-1; Peter Salem, “The
Emergence of Triage in Family Court Services: The Beginning of the End for Mandatory
Mediation?” (2009) 47 Family Court Review 371.
148. Gewurz, supra note 27 at 136.
149. Salem, supra note 147 at 383; Maxwell, supra note 135 at 337.
150. Nancy Johnson, Dennis Saccuzzo, and Wendy Koen, “Child Custody Mediation in Cases of
Domestic Violence: Empirical Evidence of a Failure to Protect” (2005) 11 Violence against
Women 1022 at 1025.
151. McEwen, Rogers, and Maiman, supra note 81 at 1336. Mary Adkins reports that thirty American
states now have “statutes specifically limiting court-affiliated mediation options for judges and
mediators in domestic violence cases,” in addition to numerous local court rules to similar
effect. Adkins, supra note 117 at 101 and 106-7.
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approximately 25 percent of referrals to family mediation are now screened out due
to domestic violence.
152
However, screening out is not a complete answer to concerns about domestic
violence and power imbalance. This is because the presence of these phenomena
do not necessarily, and perhaps should not, lead to automatic disqualification
from mediation. Cases of this nature may be mediated either intentionally
(because the violence is not considered a sufficient reason to exclude it) or uninten-
tionally (because the incidence or severity of the violence is not identified).
153
Some
argue that it is not possible to determine beforehand which cases are appropriate for
mediation
154
or that domestic victims are better off with mediation than they are in
court.
155
Depending on the nature of the litigation and the nature of the mediation,
“screening out” domestic violence victims from mediation might do them a disser-
vice,
156
and 66 percent of Canadian family mediators surveyed in 1998 did not
believe that spousal abuse should automatically preclude the use of mediation.
157
Nancy Ver Steegh suggests that a more empowering response is to encourage dom-
estic violence victims themselves to make informed choices about whether
mediation is appropriate,
158
and some jurisdictions do exactly that.
159
A recent
empirical study found that domestic violence cases were less likely to reach full
agreement in mediation than were other cases.
160
This might suggest that victims
are not necessarily so intimidated that they will accept the demands of the perpetra-
tors.
161
Even if one prefers the more orthodox view that adjudication is better than
mediation in cases of power imbalance or violence, screening is imperfect so not all
such cases will be excluded. A recent study of a court-adjunct family mediation
program in Arizona found that at least one partner reported intimate partner
abuse in 90 percent of the cases, but only 7 percent of them were screened out.
162
152. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) at 60I(b)(iii); Helen Rhoades, “Mandatory Mediation of Family
Disputes: Reflections from Australia” (2010) 32 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law
183 at 184.
153. Astor, supra note 73 at 180.
154. Robert A Baruch Bush, “Mediation and Adjudication, Dispute Resolution and Ideology: An
Imaginary Conversation” (1989) 3 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 1 at 18-19.
155. Beck et al, supra note 19.
156. Adkins, supra note 117 at 125; Kelly and Johnson, “Differentiation among Types of Intimate
Partner Violence,” supra note 64 at 492; Desmond Ellis and Noreen Stuckless, “Domestic
Violence, DOVE, and Divorce Mediation” (2006) 44 Family Court Review 658 at 658.
157. Edward Kruk, “Practice Issues, Strategies, and Models: The Current State of the Art of Family
Mediation” (1998) 36 Family Court Review 195 at 202.
158. Ver Steegh, supra note 65.
159. Adkins, supra note 117 at 123.
160. Evidence for this proposition is found in Ballard et al, supra note 63 at 17 and 21. However, one
earlier study found that reported violence did not reduce the likelihood of settlement in family
mediation. Wissler, supra note 69.
161. Ballard et al, supra note 63 at 27.
162. “Intimate partner abuse” was defined to include “physical, psychological, sexual, and stalking
abuse.” Beck et al, supra note 19 at 228 and 232. Comparable rates of screening out have
been were found in earlier studies. Maxwell, supra note 135 at 337.
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Because screening out is not a complete answer to the feminist critique,
mediation practice itself has adapted with techniques designed to give couples
with a history of violence access to safe, productive, and equitable mediation.
National surveys conducted in the United States in the mid-1990s found that
most family court mediation programs had implemented special procedures and
training for domestic violence cases.
163
Victims may be allowed to attend
mediation with a support person as an ally.
164
Shuttle or caucus mediation—in
which the parties remain in separate rooms and the mediator acts as an information
conduit between them—is often now used in domestic violence cases to avoid
leaving the parties in a room together.
165
To further reduce the chance of a
violent encounter, the spouses might even be asked to visit the facility on different
days.
166
Screening and triage tools are used not only to screen out the worst cases but
also to help mediators respond appropriately to less severe ones. For example,
Girdner’s Conflict Assessment Protocol suggests the exclusion of some cases
but recommends that others can be mediated with special ground rules and precau-
tions, including:
acknowledgment of past abuse; encouragement of the abused spouse to
pursue law enforcement remedies, such as orders of protection; and requir-
ing and monitoring attendance at anger management classes or therapy for
the abuser and services for battered women or therapy for the abused
spouse.
167
Ellis and Wight’s DOVE sorts cases into four categories based on the risk of
physical violence.
168
For example, if the software indicates that a party is at “mod-
erate risk” of physical violence, the mediator is instructed to ensure that “partners
arrive and leave at different times . . . and do not wait in the same room,” among
other things.
169
Because DOVE’s authors doubt the premise that mediation puts
victims at greater risk than the alternatives do, an indication of “very high risk”
does not lead to automatic disqualification but, rather, permits “telephone or
on-line mediation” in some circumstances.
170
163. Nancy Thoennes, Peter Salem, and Jessica Pearson, “Mediation and Domestic Violence: Current
Policies and Practices” (1995) 33 Family and Conciliation Courts Review 6; Pearson, supra note
62.
164. Ricci, supra note 23.
165. Adkins, supra note 117 at 105; Pearson, supra note 78 at 17.
166. Beck and Sales, supra note 3 at 31. In the latter model, the mediator acts as an intermediary,
gathering information from each party and conveying it to the other.
167. Girdner, supra note 138 at 373.
168. Ellis and Stuckless, supra note 156 at 662.
169. Ibid at 664.
170. Ibid at 665.
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Responding to Power Imbalance
Ensuring the physical safety of the parties is only a partial response to the
feminist critique of family mediation. The critique suggests that, even in the
absence of domestic violence, power imbalance can impede the emergence of
fair outcomes from family mediation. Like domestic violence cases, power imbal-
ance cases may not be screened out, meaning that mediators have had to learn
how to work with them. They have done so in two ways.
First, most family mediators respond to power imbalance by simply seeking to
ensure a “fair process.”
171
A survey of Canadian family mediators found that 83
percent of them agreed that they should be “interventionist in regard to process
. . . empowering the weaker party in the negotiations, and controlling the process
of mediation.”
172
For example, the mediator might pay close attention to the
amount of time that each party is given to speak. Allowing the weaker party to
speak first in a mediation can augment her power.
173
Simply making legally rel-
evant information available can also be helpful. A vulnerable party is less likely
to have a firm statutory child support entitlement “bargained away” in mediation
if the mediator has put that information “on the table” during the negotiation or
asked the parties themselves to research the matter.
174
Family mediators in some
states are required to ensure that the parties have made full financial disclosure.
175
Craig McEwen, Nancy Rogers, and Richard Maiman argue that allowing or
encouraging the parties’ lawyers to attend and participate in mandatory divorce
mediation alleviates power and fairness concerns more effectively than other regu-
latory initiatives.
176
A somewhat more interventionist approach is to arrange the
physical environment or direct pointed questions so as to empower a vulnerable
party while reining in the other.
177
Another option is co-mediation, in which a
male mediator and a female mediator conduct the session together to reduce per-
ceived or actual mediator gender bias.
178
Ensuring a fair process or level playing field might be sufficient to counteract
power imbalance in some cases. Ilan Gewurz, whose typology of power is described
above, suggests that “broad framing of the issues” and “achieving a balanced
171. McEwen, Rogers, and Maiman, supra note 81 at 1325-6; Bryan, supra note 49 at 504-5.
172. Kruk, supra note 157 at 201.
173. Angela Cora Garcia, “The Role of Interactional Competence in Mediation” (2010) 28 Conflict
Resolution Quarterly 205 at 207; Janet Rifkin, Jonathan Millen, and Sara Cobb, “Toward a
New Discourse for Mediation: A Critique of Neutrality” (1991) 9 Mediation Quarterly 151 at
162 n 2.
174. Scott and Emery, supra note 11 at 45.
175. McEwen, Rogers, and Maiman, supra note 81 at 1332-3.
176. Ibid. Penelope Bryan’s view of lawyer participation is also positive, although more ambivalent.
Penelope E Bryan, “Reclaiming Professionalism: The Lawyer’s Role in Divorce Mediation”
(1994) 28 Family Law Quarterly 177.
177. Lang, supra note 33 at 213-14.
178. Christine A Coates and Kon Dumas, “Family Mediation by the Community Mediation Service in
Boulder, Colorado” (1997) 15 Mediation Quarterly 29 at 33; Pearson, supra note 78 at 53.
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process” might be a sufficient response to purely procedural power imbalances.
179
This subtle form of power balancing can be exercised within the context of classical
“facilitative” mediation, without the mediator opining about the substantive
outcome.
However, mediators in some cases go beyond safeguarding procedure, and
assume responsibility for ensuring that the mediated outcome is itself fair. When
a power imbalance is rooted in the relationship context and psychological factors,
Gewurz calls for “more substantive protection,” which can be offered by a judge
or another authoritative and evaluative mediator closely linked to the legal
system. A mediator may forthrightly pursue an outcome that accords with the
law or with some other external criterion of fairness.
180
Mediators Joan Dworkin
and William London describe a family mediation they conducted in which the
wife was prepared to accept only 15 percent of the family’s assets—far less than
her legal entitlement.
181
While their description of the case does not suggest a
power imbalance or domestic violence, the result was clearly “unfair” if measured
against the parties’ legal entitlements. The mediators intervened and asked the
parties to reconsider, and the final property settlement gave 36 percent of the
assets to the wife.
182
Dworkin and London described their approach as a reconcilia-
tion of the principle of self-determination with the principle of fairness.
183
However, another author’s review of this article suggests that Dworkin and
London “depart[ed] their role of neutrality” and “violated their commitment to
self-determination.”
184
While the more ambitious, “substantive” form of power bal-
ancing promises a more muscular response to the problem, it is more difficult to
reconcile with the core mediation ideologies of neutrality and self-determination.
185
Perhaps for this reason, the 1998 survey found only a minority of Canadian family
mediators espousing this type of interventionism. Among the respondents, 60
percent said that the mediator should “be neutral in regard to outcome” and only
21 percent supported interventionism.
186
The Work in Progress
Family mediation’s effort to respond to power imbalance and domestic vio-
lence is a work in progress. Existing screening programs may miss many cases
179. Gewurz, supra note 27 at 154.
180. Ibid at 143.
181. Joan Dworkin and William London, “What Is a Fair Agreement?” (1989) 7 Mediation Quarterly
3.
182. Ibid at 11.
183. Ibid at 12.
184. Walther, supra note 34 at 95, n 56.
185. Ibid at 95; Bryan, supra note 49 at 505; David Greatbatch and Robert Dingwall, “Selective
Mediation: Some Preliminary Observations on a Strategy Used by Divorce Mediators” (1989)
23 Law and Society Review 613 at 615.
186. Kruk, supra note 157 at 201.
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of abuse, especially if the victims of violence do not choose to disclose it.
187
Many
victims are reluctant to do so in the early stages of working with a professional,
which is the point at which initial screening takes place.
188
Hilary Astor has
argued that victims’ silence about domestic violence is a critical problem for
family mediation screening.
189
This silence is a result not only of the perpetrator’s
control but also of society’s omerta on the subject. “Women deny violence” in
family mediation, Astor suggests, “because they live in a society that denies that
it happens.”
190
Racialized or aboriginal victims might face additional disincentives
to speak of domestic violence, insofar as doing so might reinforce stereotypes or
trigger child protection involvement in the family.
191
A recent study found that family mediators failed to identify domestic violence
in approximately half of the cases in which it was detected by a standardized ques-
tionnaire.
192
Despite advances in the study of domestic violence, there is not yet any
consensus about which types of violence justify which responses from mediators.
193
Some mediators may simply proceed in the normal way without any particular
adaptation, and one study suggests that the presence of violence may have little
effect on the mediator’s assessment of the case.
194
Some of the leading voices in the feminist critique have rejected the potential of
mediation practice modifications to respond to power imbalances.
195
Cheryl Regehr
sees power balancing as a well-intentioned but misguided response.
196
She suggests
that the feeling of empowerment that mediation can generate is temporary and illu-
sory for women. It lulls them into accepting joint custody, which in the long run
allows their ex-husbands to exercise their wonted dominion.
197
Ruth Phegan
suggests that mediators’ assertions of substantive neutrality are likewise disingenu-
ous or naive. Her argument is that “problem-solving assistance is always based on a
particular view,” and the neutrality assertion is simply a refusal to acknowledge
it.
198
Phegan interrogates three of the leading family mediation methods and
187. Beck and Sales, supra note 3 at 31.
188. Loretta Frederick, “Questions about Family Court Domestic Violence Screening and
Assessment” (2008) 46 Family Court Review 523 at 526.
189. Astor, supra note 73.
190. Ibid at 187. On the other hand, Mary Adkins has suggested that victims who know that domestic
violence precludes mediation in their jurisdiction might deny the violence in order to retain the
right to mediate. Adkins, supra note 117 at 114.
191. Astor, supra note 73 at 192; Hilary Astor, “The Weight of Silence: Talking about Violence in
Family Mediation” in Margaret Thornton, ed, Public and Private: Feminist Debates
(Melbourne, Australia: Oxford University Press, 1995) 174 at 121.
192. Holtzworth-Munroe, Beck, and Applegate, supra note 136 at 648.
193. Beck and Sales, supra note 3 at 35.
194. Johnson, Saccuzzo, and Koen, supra note 150 at 1027-8 and 1033.
195. Bryan, supra note 49 at 504-6; Grillo, supra note 54 at 1592.
196. Regehr, supra note 53.
197. Ibid at 369.
198. Phegan, supra note 98 at 395. See also Rosanna Langer, “The Juridification and Technicisation
of Alternative Dispute Resolution Practices” (1998) 13 Canadian Journal of Law and Society 169
at 182.
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concludes that all three rely on a manipulative version of systems theory, which
renders “women . . . unable to speak in their own voices and to be heard within
that system.”
199
Other feminist family law scholars view the debate over mediation as a diver-
sion. Elizabeth Pickett argued in 1991 that both child custody adjudication and
child custody mediation were coming to reflect a dangerous “familial ideology” cel-
ebrating privacy and shared parenting. She therefore questioned the preference of
many feminist mediation critics for formal adjudication, calling instead for a
focus on the ideology itself.
200
Writing in the same year, N. Zoe Hilton identified
a “mediation philosophy of the ‘new family,’ ” which was infiltrating family dispute
resolution in both its adjudicatory and mediatory variants.
201
Pickett and Hilton
therefore concluded that the pro or con family mediation debate was a gratuitous
distraction from feminism’s real goals.
The feminist critique continues to be the source of live policy debates in family
service delivery. One such debate pertains to the role of lawyers in mediation pro-
grams, which, as noted earlier, may often be discouraged.
202
Many feminists and
others see legal representation as an indispensable safeguard,
203
although some
criticize the assumption that independent legal advice is an effective safeguard
for vulnerable parties.
204
In Australia, the 2006 reforms originally forbade
lawyers to attend mediation sessions at the new Family Relationship Centres.
However, in 2009, the government adopted a more liberal policy regarding the
role of lawyers in family disputes.
205
While these debates continue, it seems clear that family mediation theory has
substantially internalized the feminist critique, and family mediation practice has
adapted in response to it. Screening and triage are de rigeur in court-adjunct pro-
grams. Today, many mediators look for evidence of power imbalance and domestic
violence, screen out inappropriate cases, and mediate the remainder in a manner that
is sensitive to these concerns.
199. Phegan, supra note 98 at 413.
200. Pickett, supra note 82.
201. Hilton, supra note 75 at 46 and 51-3.
202. McEwen, Rogers, and Maiman, supra note 81 at 1329; Harvey Brownstone, Tug of War: A
Judge’s Verdict on Separation, Custody Battles, and the Bitter Realities of Family Court
(Toronto: ECW Press, 2009) at 38. There is a dearth of recent Canadian evidence about the
proportion of family mediation sessions that include lawyers.
203. McEwen, Rogers, and Maiman, supra note 81; Rosemary Hunter, “Adversarial Mythologies:
Policy Assumptions and Research Evidence in Family Law” (2003) 30 Journal of Law and
Society 156; Becky Batagol, “Fomenters of Strife, Gladiatorial Champions or Something Else
Entirely? Lawyers and Family Dispute Resolution” (2008) 8 Queensland University of
Technology Law and Justice Journal 24.
204. For example, Phegan, supra note 98 at 384, citing Diana Majury, “Against Women’s Interests:
An Issues Paper on Joint Custody and Mediation” (National Action Committee on the Status of
Women, 1987) [unpublished].
205. Rhoades, supra note 152 at 185.
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This progress is reflected in Ontario’s Family Mediation Service (FMS). These
subsidized, voluntary mediation sessions are now available in every court that hears
family matters.
206
While a full analysis of FMS is beyond the scope of this article,
the province’s lengthy 2011 request for proposals (RFP) for new family mediation
providers indicates responsiveness to the feminist critique.
207
The RFP makes dom-
estic violence screening mandatory for FMS providers. Although the precise screen-
ing tool is not specified, mediators are required to comply with a policy setting out
the format and required content of the interview.
208
In keeping with the practices
described earlier, some violence cases are to be screened out, while others can
proceed with safeguards.
209
The RFP, like the scholarly literature, is somewhat less explicit about what power
imbalance is and what it means for mediation. However, the RFP states that
“mediation is only suited to people who are in a relatively equal negotiating pos-
ition.” It adds that, when used in cases of violence or “clear and inherent power
imbalance,” mediation can lead to “unfair results” and “perpetuate one party’s
control over the other.”
210
Mediation providers are required to screen for “issues
related to power and coercive control” in addition to violence, both during the
intake stage and continuously throughout the mediation process.
211
No mediation
is to occur unless “any inequality in bargaining power can be managed so as to
ensure that negotiations are balanced and procedurally fair.”
212
The feminist argument for lawyers’ participation in family mediation is reflected
in Ontario’s RFP. Although mediators are not required to include parties’ lawyers in
every mediation, they are required to encourage parties to seek legal advice and to
be “very flexible” regarding the inclusion of lawyers in the sessions.
213
“Balanc[ing] bargaining power on a particular issue where one party is at a
disadvantage” is one example the RFP gives of a good reason to include lawyers
in a particular mediation.
214
The feminist analysis is also evident in the Chief Justice of Ontario’s mandatory
mediation proposal mentioned at the outset of this article.
215
Chief Justice Warren
Winkler’s scheme (which has emerged piecemeal in a series of interviews and
speeches) includes an initial judicial triage stage, which would direct some cases
directly to court. While Winkler called for “mandatory” mediation in 2010, by
206. Attorney General News Release, supra note 1.
207. Ministry of the Attorney General (Ontario), Request for Proposals for Family Mediation and
Information Services at the Ontario Court of Justice and the Superior Court of Justice
Locations (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 2011).
208. Ibid at 78.
209. Ibid at 80.
210. Ibid at 6.
211. Ibid at 8.
212. Ibid at 9.
213. Ibid at 10.
214. Ibid.
215. See sources listed in note 2 in this article.
Vol. 24 2012 233
2011 he was proposing “presumptive” mediation.
216
This change was reportedly
motivated by protest from within the family bar regarding the unsuitability of
mediation in some domestic violence cases.
217
While evaluating the efficacy of
these screening processes is beyond the scope of this article, they at least show
awareness of, and responsiveness to, the feminist critique of mandatory family
mediation.
Family Mediation and the Settlement Mission
In critically evaluating mandatory mediation, it is important to think carefully
about appropriate comparators. If an abused and disempowered family litigant does
not mediate, what will she do instead? The feminist critique outlined earlier has
been alert to this issue, comparing mediation to both adjudication and bipartite
negotiation as alternative dispute resolution processes. I will suggest here that
mediation must also be compared to the “settlement mission,” which is the informal
and unregulated encouragement or pressure to settle that judges and other family
justice system workers apply to litigants. It goes beyond the (accurate) expectation
that most cases will settle, it is the active effort on the part of these workers to bring
about this result. The settlement mission is pursued in judicial pre-trial conferences
and interviews with social workers, and participation in these meetings is often obli-
gatory for family litigants. Experiencing the informal settlement mission is therefore
often mandatory for them, potentially giving rise to the same concerns that femin-
ists have articulated about mandatory formal mediation. Moreover, unlike family
mediation, the settlement mission is not necessarily accompanied by screening,
triage, or power balancing. From the point of view of the feminist critique, the
informal settlement mission is therefore potentially more dangerous than formal
family mediation.
The author coined the term “settlement mission” during empirical research in
which he interviewed twenty-eight family justice system professionals in Toronto
and New York City.
218
The focus of the interviews was the work of formally
neutral family justice system workers—judges and child custody evaluators
(CCEs). A CCE is a social worker or mental health professional who investigates
a family with a custody or access dispute and recommends a parenting arrangement
in the best interest of the child.
216. Warren Winkler, “Remarks to the County of Carleton Law Association Annual Institute of Family
Law 2011” (delivered in Ottawa, 8 April 2011), online: Court of Appeal for Ontario,http://www.
ontariocourts.on.ca/coa/en/ps/speeches/2011-Annual-Institute-Family-Law-CCLA.htm..
217. Kirk Makin, “A Program to Fix Our Ailing Family Courts,” Globe and Mail (25 March 2011),
online: Globe and Mail ,http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/a-program-to-fix-
our-ailing-family-courts/article1957443/..
218. Ethics approval was granted for the interviews by the York University Human Participants
Review Sub-Committee (Certificate no. 2009-161, granted on 25 November 2009).
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The author expected to find judges and CCEs pursuing the “analytical
mission”—which is to say, trying to identify the legally correct answers in a
given case. The most important legal questions in a family law dispute are
usually (1) how much money should be paid, on what terms, and by whom; and
(2) what post-separation parenting arrangement is in the best interest of the child
or children. Custody assessors almost invariably have formal roles that are analyti-
cal in nature. Statutes point to a decision-making job for these workers, especially in
the case of CCEs.
219
An analytical role is also what litigants probably expect from
both judges and CCEs.
In fact, however, these family justice system workers often pursue, and in some
cases prioritize, the settlement mission, which means encouraging or pressuring the
parties to voluntarily resolve their dispute.
220
They do so on the basis of a presump-
tion that settlement is in the best interests of the family. As one recent article
observed, the de facto priority of family courts is not to make and enforce legal
decisions but, rather, “to resolve conflicts and encourage parents to put the past
behind.”
221
Family judges generally pursue settlement in the pre-trial conferences,
which are now mandatory for family litigants in Ontario and many other jurisdic-
tions.
222
For example, one Toronto provincial court judge told the author that
“every court appearance is an opportunity to settle the case,”
223
another said that
if litigants “think they have a chance of settling, that’s our job, that’s what we’re
here for.”
224
CCEs generally pursue settlement towards the end of their investigative process,
often seeking to convince the parents to voluntarily settle so that the CCE’s report
need not be forwarded to the judge in charge of the case. One experienced child
custody evaluator told the author that his “whole process is designed to be one
that tries to create a mediational environment, so that there’s a higher probability
of settlement afterwards.” He does so because, “with limited exceptions . . . the
research definitively tells us that it’s the plan the parents come up with and agree
to that always works best for the children in that family.”
225
This statement
was striking, given that the apparent premise of child custody evaluation practice
is that an expert’s opinion is necessary in order to identify the best interest of
the child.
In pursuing settlement, family justice system workers use many of the same tech-
niques that mediators do. Mediation methods have traditionally been divided into
219. For example, regarding Ontario CCEs, see the Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C43;
Children’s Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c C12 at s 30.
220. Noel Semple, “Judicial Settlement-Seeking in Parenting Disputes: Consensus and Controversy,”
Conflict Resolution Quarterly [forthcoming in 2012], online: Social Science Research Network
,http://ssrn.com/abstract=1687268. .
221. Jaffe, Crooks, and Bala, supra note 140 at 170 and 175. See also Adkins, supra note 117 at 119.
222. Family Law Rules, O Reg 114/99, Rule 17.
223. Interview with Justice “BB,” Ontario Court of Justice in Toronto (4 January 2010).
224. Interview with Justice “DD,” Ontario Court of Justice in Toronto (3 March 2010).
225. Interview with “GG,” Psychologist in Toronto (4 February 2010).
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the “facilitative” and the “evaluative,”
226
and the author found each of these in the
interviewees’ descriptions of their settlement-seeking work.
227
Pursuing the settle-
ment mission may simply mean asking questions that are designed to show the
parties their “common ground,” thereby leading them to consensus. It can also
involve much more activist techniques such as “talking down” each party from
their more ambitious claims.
228
The author critically analyzes the settlement
mission in another article.
229
Whereas the scholarship about formal family mediation has engaged with, and
evolved in response to, the feminist critique, the same does not appear to be true
of the informal settlement mission. By contrast to the mediation scholarship,
there is very little literature on judicial settlement seeking that engages with the
specificities of the family law context.
230
Even less has been written about settle-
ment seeking among CCEs—their role has been defined almost exclusively in
terms of the analytical mission.
231
Feminists have critiqued the analytical and
decision-making work of judges and CCEs in family law cases, but the informal
and almost clandestine nature of the settlement mission has sheltered it from this
scrutiny.
So much for theory; what of practice? More research is clearly needed regarding
whether or not the settlement mission is pursued in a different way, or perhaps not
pursued at all, in cases of violence or power imbalance. The absence of scholarly
engagement does not mean that settlement seekers are ignorant of these issues or
that they do not respond to them. For example, the Office of the Children’s
Lawyer, which provides CCEs in Ontario and pursues settlement while doing
so,
232
also runs incoming cases through a comprehensive triage system.
233
Nonetheless, it is clear that the settlement mission lacks many of the safeguards
that have been brought to mediation practice in response to the feminist critique.
While statutes exclude domestic violence cases from mediation in many
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jurisdictions, they conspicuously do not say that judges and CCEs must not pursue
the settlement mission in cases of this nature.
234
Since the settlement mission is
pursued informally and off the record, its practitioners have a certain scope to
apply their own values or biases.
235
For example, one New York family court
judge whom the author interviewed described her approach in settlement confer-
ences as follows:
I feel very strongly about a child spending time with both parents, and as
much time as possible with both parents. So if somebody’s trying to limit
that, for whatever reason, then I push back at that . . . that’s not the way I
view it . . . I think because it’s more subjective I tend to interpose more of
how I look at that.
236
One interesting documentation of the judicial settlement mission is New York
City’s matrimonial judge Ellen Gesmer’s “Custody Speech.”
237
Justice Gesmer reg-
ularly delivers this speech, in pre-trial conferences, to parents litigating over child
custody or access. She had the speech transcribed and uses it as part of her cam-
paign material in judicial elections to demonstrate her approach to these cases.
The key message of Justice Gesmer’s custody speech to parents is: “[B]y far the
best thing for [your children] would be if you could make a decision together about
these issues.”
238
The speech then provides several reasons why the parents hearing
it should settle instead of proceeding with litigation. These include the damage that
a trial would do to the children; the financial and emotional cost of a trial; the fact
that parents are in a better position to identify their child’s best interest than Justice
Gesmer is; and the fact that a trial will make the parents angrier and therefore less
able to co-operatively parent in the future.
239
Finally, the speech implies that not
settling might undermine the parents’ authority, with dire consequences for the
child’s well-being:
Having a custody battle creates another risk for your teenager. She is at an
age where she is facing social pressures, about drugs or alcohol or friends.
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I know that you hope that she will turn to you for help in making these
difficult decisions. From her point of view, the most important decision
that you have ever made or will ever make is what’s going to happen to
her and her little brother. If you go to trial, she will know that the two
of you were unable to make that decision, and that you had to turn to a
total stranger—me—to make it. She might conclude that you’re not very
good at making decisions, and that you’re not the kind of people that
she can rely on when she has difficult decisions to make.
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Does this document tell us anything about the place of the feminist critique in the
settlement mission? Justice Gesmer is a highly respected and experienced matrimo-
nial judge and presumably entirely cognizant of the dangers of power imbalance
and domestic violence. There is nothing in her custody speech that suggests that
she exploits or ignores these issues. However, neither is there any mention of
them within it. The preamble to the speech suggests that it is delivered to
custody litigants as a matter of course—if parents “are fighting about their children,
I speak to them at length about why they should come to an agreement about caring
for their children, and the many reasons that it is damaging to their children to go to
a trial.”
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Gesmer’s custody speech provides an interesting contrast to Ontario’s
court mediation services RFP, discussed earlier, which takes some care to temper
its settlement-promoting message with provisos attributable to the feminist critique
of family mediation.
Two points arise from this comparison between mandatory mediation and the
informal settlement mission. First, the fact that a jurisdiction does not have manda-
tory mediation does not mean that a family litigant will not be subjected to compul-
sory encouragement to settle her dispute. It is likely that a formally neutral third
party such as a CCE or a judge will encourage her, or pressure her, to settle.
Whether this pursuit of settlement is properly considered “mediation” or not is
debateable, but from the perspective of the litigant the motivations of the interven-
tion would probably seem similar.
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Second, many of the concerns articulated by the feminist critique seem to be
more applicable to the settlement mission than they are to formal mediation. The
settlement mission is pursued on an ad hoc and informal basis by judges and
CCEs. Especially for judges, their choices about whether to pursue it are not con-
strained by statute, by formal screening mechanisms, or by any higher power. A liti-
gant going into court (or into the child custody evaluator’s office) for the first time
has no way of knowing whether, or how, the settlement mission will be pursued.
While some are certainly alert to the issues raised by the feminist critique, training
in this area is not the formalized requirement that it is for most mediators today.
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Helen Rhoades has pointed out that, while Australian mediators are required to have
special domestic violence training, judges and lawyers are not. To Rhoades, this
reality casts doubt on the argument that victims of domestic violence are better
off with legal professionals than they are with mediators.
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It is not the author’s intention to suggest that most family justice system workers
pursue the settlement mission in a way that leads to exploitative outcomes for
women, domestic violence survivors, or other vulnerable parties. Nor does the
settlement mission necessarily do more harm than good, given the demonstrable
benefits that settlement has for family litigants and their children. Rather, the argu-
ment is that the feminist critique of mandatory mediation may be less applicable to
modern mandatory mediation than it is to the informal and unregulated settlement
mission.
Moreover, there are good reasons to believe that mandatory mediation and the
settlement mission are, to some extent, alternatives. If more litigants resolved
their disputes through non-judicial mediation, fewer of them would attend the
pre-trial conferences in which judges pursue the settlement mission. Chief
Justice Winkler, in arguing for mandatory mediation, implied that it could be
accompanied by a rollback of the pre-trial conference system.
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If mediation
were made available as a sufficiently early intervention, it might also reduce the
need for child custody evaluations in which the settlement mission is also
pursued. To the extent that avoiding mediation means increased exposure of vulner-
able parties to the settlement mission, the feminist arguments developed earlier
could weigh in favour of Justice Winkler’s proposal. This analysis points,
however tentatively, to a paradoxical conclusion. The feminist critique of manda-
tory family mediation may be an argument for, rather than against, the adoption
of mandatory family mediation in its modern form.
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